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Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to develop a framework by drawing on three broad perspectives 
on resilience: engineering, ecological, and evolutionary, and to use this framework to 
critically examine the approach adopted by the draft London’s climate change adaptation 
strategy. The central argument of the paper is that the Strategy’s emergency planning-
centred approach to climate adaptation veers between a standard ecological 
understanding of resilience and the more rigid engineering model. Its emphasis is on 
identifying ‘exposure’ and ‘vulnerability’ to risk from climate events and on bouncing 
back from the consequences of such exposures to a normal state, rather than on the 
dynamic process of transformation to a more desirable trajectory. The paper concludes 
that fostering resilience involves planning for not only recovery from shocks, but also 
cultivating preparedness, and seeking potential transformative opportunities which 
emerge from change.  
 
1. Introduction  
Resilience is a contested concept which is “in danger of becoming a vacuous buzzword” 
as a result of its “overuse and ambiguity” (Rose, 2007). From its original use in the 
physical sciences, engineering and ecology, resilience has made its way into a wide 
range of disciplines including psychology, disaster management, economics, geography, 
and planning. Over the last decade, it has come into heightened use in policy and 
practice, where resilience is largely seen as a response to climate change uncertainties 
and socio-economic insecurities. Building resilience has become a major component of 
climate adaptation, environmental management, regional economic development, and 
strategic planning. Despite, or probably because of, this proliferation resilience has 
remained a fuzzy concept.   
This paper aims to develop a conceptual framework for assessing the resilience-building 
claims in climate adaptation strategies (Section Three) by drawing on the three distinct 
perspectives on resilience (engineering, ecological, and evolutionary) which are 
discussed in Davoudi (2012a) (Section Two). This framework is used to critically 
examine the approach adopted by London’s draft (2010) climate change adaptation 
strategy (Section Four). The main argument is that the Strategy’s approach was based 
on engineering / ecological resilience, but would have benefited from embracing the 
evolutionary understanding of resilience. The paper concludes (Section Five) by 
discussing the implications of resilience thinking for climate change adaptation strategies 
and more broadly, for planning thought and practices. The empirical work in the paper 
draws on some of the findings from an interdisciplinary research project on ‘Adaptation 
and Resilience in Cities: Analysis and Decision-making using Integrated Assessment’, 
funded by the UK Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council. i A qualitative 
research method was adopted which included a detailed and systematic review of the 
Strategy’s approach to climate change adaptation based on a risk-by-risk gap analysis 
(Davoudi et al., 2010) and a series of semi-structured interviews (9 in total) and 
workshop discussions (6 in total) with key actors and project stakeholders. The various 
gaps identified in this study are indicative of a broader limitation in the Strategy’s 
resilience concept, which this paper elaborates.  
2. The three faces of resilience  
 
Following Davoudi (2012a), the term resilience derives from the Latin word resilire, 
meaning to spring back. So, it is not surprising that resilience is often used to mean the 
capacity to bounce back or to rebound. Indeed, physical scientists first used the term to 
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describe the resistance of materials to external shocks. In the 1960s ecologists (Holling, 
1961; Morris, 1963; Lewontin, 1969) began to use the term and further develop the 
concept. The culprit was Crawford Stanley Holling’s article in which he explained the 
distinction between resilience and stability in ecological systems, arguing that “a system 
can be very resilient and still fluctuate greatly, i.e. have low stability” (Holling, 1973:17). 
Since then, numerous studies, particularly in the field of ecology, have contributed to 
resilience thinking. Based on an extensive review of literature from a wide range of 
disciplines, Davoudi (2012a) distinguishes between three broad conceptualisations of 
resilience: engineering, ecological and socio-ecological resilience (Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002). Following Simmie and Martin (2010), she calls the latter evolutionary 
resilience. These will be elaborated in turn.  
 
From a single equilibrium to multiple equilibria (engineering and ecological 
resilience) 
 
In his pioneering article that drew the distinction between stability and resilience, Holling 
suggested that “Stability [...] is the ability of a system to return to an equilibrium state 
after a temporary disturbance” (Holling, 1973:17). He named this ‘domain of stability’ 
engineering resilience (Holling, 1973, 1986). Engineering resilience refers to the ability 
of a system to return to an equilibrium or steady-state after a disturbance. The emphasis 
is on return time, “efficiency, constancy and predictability”, all of which are deemed 
essential for optimal engineering design and for making the mathematics tractable 
(Holling, 1996:33; Gunderson, 2000). A similar static, engineering-based 
conceptualisation of resilience is also embraced by disaster studies.  
  
Contrasting with stability, Holling suggested that, “Resilience ... is a measure of the 
ability of these systems to absorb changes [...] and still persist” (Holling, 1973:17). This 
was later called ecological resilience (Walker et al., 1969; Holling, 1996). It rejects the 
existence of a single equilibrium and instead suggests that there are multiple equilibria, 
and that “instabilities can flip a system into another [...] stability domain” (Gunderson, 
2000: 426). Ecological resilience thus places the emphasis on persistence, change, and 
unpredictability, attributes that are embraced by evolutionary biologists. The emphasis is 
not just on how long it takes for the system to bounce back after a disturbance but also, 
how much disturbance it can take and still persist, before changing function. While 
engineering resilience focuses on maintaining efficiency of function, ecological resilience 
focuses on maintaining existence of function (Holling, 1996:33). 
 
Beyond equilibrium (evolutionary resilience) 
 
What engineering and ecological resilience have in common is the notion of a stable 
equilibrium, “be it a pre-existing [state] to which a resilient system bounces back 
(engineering) or a new [state] to which it bounces forth (ecological)” (Davoudi, 2012a: 
301). More recently the idea that the nature of the stability domain itself remains fixed 
over time has been challenged by socio-ecological approaches to resilience (Scheffer, 
2009). Socio-ecological resilience argues in favour of “people and nature as 
interdependent systems” (Folke et al., 2010: 21). Rather than conceiving resilience as “a 
return to normalcy” (Pendall et al. 2010:76), this perspective interprets it as the ability 
of complex social-ecological systems to change, adapt, or transform in response to 
stresses and strains (Carpenter et al., 2005). Given the similarities between this view of 
resilience and the evolutionary perspective, as suggested by Simmie and Martin (2010) 
in the context of economic geography, Davoudi (2012a) calls this approach evolutionary 
resilience.  
 
The idea is that the structure and functions of systems undergo four distinct phases of 
change. Holling (1986) calls this the ‘adaptive cycle’. Visualising them in the form infinity 
curves (Figure 1) to represent systems on different scales, it is suggested that the 
phases include: growth, conservation, creative destruction, and reorganisation 
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(Gunderson and Holling, 2002). The growth phase (r) is characterised by: rapid 
accumulation of resources (capitals), competition, seizing of opportunities, rising level of 
diversity and connections, and high but decreasing, resilience. At conservation phase (K) 
growth slows down as resources are stored and used largely for system maintenance. 
This phase is characterised by: stability, certainty, reduced flexibility, and low resilience. 
The creative destruction phase (Ω) is characterised by chaotic collapse and release of 
accumulated capital. This is a time of uncertainty when resilience is low but increasing. 
The reorganisation phase, (α), is a time of innovation, restructuring and greatest 
uncertainty but with high resilience (Pendall et al., 2010:76).  
 
 
Figure 1: The Adaptive Cycle 
Source: adapted from Holling and Gunderson (2002:34-41) and Gunderson (2009:5)  
 
These phases occur in ‘panarchical’, rather than hierarchical, cycles “which are nested 
one within each other [sic] across space and time scales” (Holling 2001:396). This 
implies that firstly, the phases are not necessarily sequential or fixed (i.e. systems may 
skip a phase and move from r directly to Ω). Secondly, systems function not in a single 
cycle, but, as depicted in Figure 1, in a series of nested adaptive cycles that operate and 
interact at multiple scalesii (smaller and larger) and speeds (slow and fast). This is the 
basis of ‘panarchy’iii (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Thus, in complex adaptive systems 
there are continual interactions between small and large systems and slow and fast 
ones. The longer, slower processes operate at a larger scale and the shorter, faster ones 
occur at smaller scales. By going through the adaptive cycles, they self-organise and 
maintain resilience. However, if they get stuck in the conservation phase they may 
become locked in and hence more vulnerable to future strains which can disrupt the 
whole system. The adaptive cycle does not in itself offer a framework for ‘measuring’ 
resilience; but rather, it offers an evolutionary understanding of resilience as continually 
altering, as the system adapts and changes.  
 
3. Resilience as a conceptual framework  
 
The above account confirms Swanstrom’s (2008:2) view that, “resilience is more than a 
metaphor but less than a theory. At best it is a conceptual framework” that helps us 
think about processes such as climate adaptation in new ways that are more dynamic 
and holistic. Evolutionary resilience broadens the description of resilience “beyond its 
meaning as a buffer for conserving what you have and recovering to what you were” 
(Folke et al., 2010: 25), to incorporate the dynamic interplay between persistence, 
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adaptability and transformability across multiple scales and timeframes in ecological 
(natural) systems (Davoudi, 2012a drawing on: Holling and Gunderson, 2002; Walker et 
al., 2004; and Folke et al. 2010; see also, Miller et al., 2010; Galderisi et al., 2010). In 
the social context, this kind of systems thinking may seem overly deterministic, not 
allowing for human intervention to break the cycle through technologies, ingenuities and 
foresights. This implies that “the cycle itself as well as changes in resilience may be 
anticipated and, thus, encouraged or thwarted by systems design and management” 
(Pendall et al., 2010:78). Therefore, we suggest that in the context of socio-ecological 
systems, a fourth component should be added to the three mentioned above to reflect 
the intentionality of human action and intervention. We call it preparedness (see also 
Gunderson, 2009).  
 
Together, this four-dimensional framework (Figure 2) suggests that, in the face of either 
sudden or slow burning disturbances, complex adaptive socio-ecological systems, such 
as the City of London, can become more or less resilient depending on their social 
learning capacity (being prepared) for enhancing their chances of: resisting disturbances 
(being persistent and robust), absorbing disturbances without crossing a threshold into 
an undesirable and possibly irreversible trajectory (being flexible and adaptable), and 
moving towards a more desirable trajectory (being innovative and transformative).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Four-dimensional framework for resilience building 
Source: the authors 
 
In the following section we draw on this framework to critically examine the resilience-
building strategies in London’s draft climate change adaptation strategy.  
 
4. Draft climate change adaptation strategy for London 
 
In August 2008 the GLA published a ‘London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy’ 
(LCCAS)iv that set out priorities and actions seen as critical for managing climate related 
risks (GLA, 2008). A draft for public consultation (from here on referred to as the 
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‘Strategy’) was made available for three months in February 2010 (GLA, 2010a) with a 
timeframe encompassing the period of the 21st century but especially focusing on the 
years up to 2031. v  “The aim of [...] the Strategy is to assess the consequences of 
climate change on London and to prepare for the impacts of climate change and extreme 
weather to protect and enhance the quality of life of Londoners” (GLA, 2010a: 15-16).  
The term ‘prepare’ is central in understanding the nature of the document, because the 
majority of the Strategy’s “proposed actions fall under the ‘prepare’ heading” (ibid.: 19) 
rather than “actions on the ground” (p.19). The reason for this, according to the 
Strategy itself (p.19), is the fact that this is the first such strategy and time needs to be 
invested in developing understanding and capacity to deliver. Hence, the primary aim of 
the proposed actions is to “increase our understanding of the challenges we face, to 
ensure that ... we have emergency plans for when extreme weather events occur” (p.7). 
Most of the proposed actions are thus collaborative, partnership-based interventions. 
Furthermore, the bulk of the actions (27 out of 34) are related to three defined types of 
climate change risk (flooding, drought and heatwave) which have been selected from 
among a slightly wider range of climate risks on the grounds of their relative 
predictability. The remaining seven actions focus on ‘crosscutting’ issues of: health, 
environment, economy and infrastructure.  
   
A roadmap to resilience? 
 
From the resilience perspective cities can be seen as complex, adaptive socio-ecological 
systems, consisting of internal structures and processes which can be best understood 
by their self-organisation, emergent properties, non-linear and unpredictable dynamics 
and patterns of abrupt changes (Costanza et al., 1993). Within this perspective, climate-
related events, such as flooding, are considered as external perturbations or 
disturbances to these systems. Resilience or adaptive capacity is seen as embodied in 
the emergent properties of these socio-ecological systems. This means that resilience is 
not an asset but a process of change; “not [..] a being but […] a becoming” (Davoudi, 
2012a: 304). It is a concept that only actually attains performance after the system is 
confronted with disturbances and stresses. However, unlike other life forms, human 
beings can make conscious interventions into the process, and through such 
interventions, planned or otherwise, can diminish, sustain, or enhance resilience. The 
latter should be the primary aim of any climate adaptation strategy.   
 
Such an aim is implied by the proposals mooted in the London Strategy and 
encapsulated in a chapter entitled “Roadmap to Resilience” (Chapter 10, p.119). 
Elsewhere in the document, gaps in climate change planning are identified, and there are 
other references to actions that can be taken by the “Mayor and partners” and by 
“Londoners” to “improve resilience” (p.19). Furthermore, the main agency responsible 
for dealing with adaptation is called the London Resilience Partnership (chaired by the 
Mayor of London). Despite all this and as our analysis will demonstrate, the approach 
adopted by the Strategy is different from resilience thinking. One indication of this is that 
resilience is defined (in an endnote) as the second best outcome after resistance and as 
a damage reduction action. Thus, the Strategy suggests that, “Flood resistance refers to 
taking measures to make sure that flood water cannot enter a property. Flood resilience 
refers to taking measures to minimise flood damage when a property is flooded and 
ensure that it can be brought back into full use as quickly as possible” (GLA, 2010a, 
p.130, emphasis added). This seems a very narrow interpretation of resilience which 
begs the question: why does the Strategy provide a ‘roadmap to resilience’ if it is 
considered as a less desirable outcome than resistance? Our critique of the Strategy is 
meant neither to undermine the Strategy’s pioneering contribution to climate change 
planning in the UK, nor to deny that it is ahead, in most respects, of other UK regions in 
its portrayal of a range of climate-related social and ecological, as well as economic risks 
and consequences. Neither would we wish to diminish the importance of its attempts to 
map institutional responsibilities and gaps in relation to predictable climate emergencies 
(see Davoudi et al, 2010). Nevertheless, the shifting, rhetorical use of the term 
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‘resilience’ in the Strategy is to some extent an indication of the limited conceptualisation 
of the nature and purpose of planning for climate change adaptation. 
 
The P2R2 framework   
 
The Draft Strategy “uses the ’Prevent, Prepare, Respond, Recover’ framework developed 
by emergency planners” (p.19) and rooted in disaster risk studies and management 
practices. The emergency planning model is not prescribed for Climate Change 
adaptation planning generally, nor as part of the GLA’s ‘climate change duty’, enshrined 
in the 2007 GLA Act, and it does not structure other regional authorities’ adaptation 
plans. However, the emergency planning approach adopted in the Draft Strategy 
appears to be connected with local authorities’ duty, under the Civil Contingencies Act, 
2004 to draw up plans for risks and major emergencies and carry out regular risk 
assessment. It links with the Emergency Plans that all London Boroughs have to provide 
and which may either directly cover, or cross reference to, climate risk plans, for 
example plans for flooding (GLA, 2010a:31). Thus, in conformity with the statutory 
obligations, there is a tendency for the London Strategy to focus on responses to sudden 
and extreme climate events rather than on long term, small and incremental changes 
(which it nevertheless acknowledges). This contrasts with evolutionary resilience which 
acknowledges that small changes can reverberate through the system and cause large 
effects, while large alterations may have negligible systemic impacts.  
 
The P2R2 framework (as we call it) is applied to three main climate risks in London: 
flooding, drought and heatwave, treated largely in isolation from each other. While 
attempts are made to examine climate impacts on the Strategy’s ‘crosscutting’ issues, it 
is not clear what happens if several events occur at the same time, as highlighted 
through our interviews. Although adaptation is defined by the Strategy as “a dynamic 
process” with “no steady state of being ‘adapted’” (p. 17), P2R2 presents a relatively 
static and linear process that starts with preventative measures and ends with crisis 
recovery. Such a linear approach, placing its emphasis on the temporal order of 
interventions, is weak on showing the relative urgency of the various proposed actions 
and identified gaps. Neither does it acknowledge the interconnection between the phases 
at multiple scales and time frames. Yet, as one interviewee commented, “the decisions 
that people are making now are actually the things that are causing the risk [...], the 
fact that we have built so densely, that we have built across sunny bits of flood plains 
[...] that we have allowed things to get concreted over, that we use all this energy” 
(interview, 2009).  
 
Furthermore, the split between the phases and their definitions is sometimes unhelpful 
as is evident in the application of P2R2 to the three selected risks. A notable example is 
the ‘prevention’ phase which is defined as “actions taken to reduce the probability and / 
or consequences of an impact” (p.19). By contrast, the ‘Prepare’ phase, which comes 
second in the sequence, is defined as “actions taken to better understand the risk and 
opportunities ahead of the change occurring and to proactively enable an effective 
response and recovery” (p.19). However, measures that are defined as ‘preventative’ 
under the Strategy’s definition may rather be considered as part of preparation or 
response. For example, “raising flood defences to prevent flooding” is seen by the 
Strategy as a preventative measure but it can equally be considered as a response at 
the time of impact. Similarly, “removing ... development from the flood plain”, classed in 
the Strategy as a preventative action (p.19) can just as well be seen as a preparatory 
action which aims to identify and manage patterns of vulnerabilities (as discussed 
below). The fact that actions proposed for one phase can equally belong to another 
phase is not a trivial matter. It highlights the limitations of the rigid categorisation of 
actions and its unhelpful linearity, which is in sharp contrast with resilience thinking and 
its view of cities as interconnected systems with porous boundaries and extensive 
feedback processes which occur over multiple scales and time frames.   
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In the following section, we draw on the resilience framework and its four components, 
developed in section three, to present a critique of the Strategy and its P2R2 approach. 
Our emphasis is on the Strategy’s broad approach rather than its detailed contents and 
proposed actions which we only draw upon as illustrative examples.  
 
Preparedness 
 
An important characteristic of social systems (in contrast with ecological systems) is 
humans’ capacity for foresight and intentionality (Holling 2001) and their search for 
ways to enhance their ability to anticipate and plan. “A forest cannot prevent fire or stop 
climate change. Humans can” (Swanstrom, 2008:18). The nonlinearities and cross-scale 
interactions of complex systems make them inherently unpredictable. Acknowledging 
this, however, has not deterred people from finding new technologies and ways of 
reducing uncertainty. Studies undertaken for understanding the extent and severity of 
future tidal and fluvial flood risks in London and the capacity of flood barriers and 
drainage systems to withstand them exemplify such attempts (see particularly the 
Thames Estuary 2100 Project – Environment Agency, 2009). More challenging still is to 
foresee the impact of such events and the type of ‘surprises’ which may emerge from 
those impacts. These inherent uncertainties require a learning-based approach to both 
accumulation of knowledge and identification of vulnerabilities and opportunities. All are 
adhered to in the Strategy’s ‘prepare’ stage but with some major limitations, as 
discussed below. Understanding the probability of events has occupied a large portion of 
the GLA’s time and efforts and the bulk of the Strategy’s contents. Major studies and 
quantitative modelling have been used by the GLA to strengthen the evidence base of 
the Strategy. Yet, as noted by one interviewee: “policies themselves are good, but they 
do not necessarily match up as new policies have emerged [...], it’s because the pace of 
the science and understanding has moved in an unprecedented way, that policy is 
already out of date” (interview, 2009). 
 
By contrast, the Strategy’s understanding of consequences and impacts of events is 
much less informed by evidence. This has led to a lack of prioritisation of the proposed 
actions. There are other gaps too, such as limited understanding of the patterns of 
surface water flooding (p.40) or intense local windstorms (p.28). These are 
acknowledged in the Strategy but a gap which it does not identify is the use of non-
coded, experiential knowledge. While past incidence of flooding and heat wave are 
mentioned along with detailed statistical data about their social, financial and health 
consequences (and a self-recorded system of flood incidence is promised in Action 4, 
p.5), there is little mention of past experiences in terms of lessons learnt or peoples’ and 
institutions’ coping strategies. Where they are mentioned, communities are mainly 
viewed as the passive recipients of protective measures, rather than as partners and 
participants in climate adaptation. There is no acknowledgement of the usefulness of 
collective memory or personal narrative, both of which are essential for the process of 
social learning. Cross-scale learning from experiences of one type of risk to another is 
also rare though promised (See Action 27, P.13).   
         
Identifying potential opportunities as well as vulnerabilities is another critical feature of 
preparedness. While the bulk of the 34 proposed Actions in the Strategy are of a 
preparatory nature, only five are related to identifying opportunities (Actions 
17,18,19,20,30), viewed narrowly in terms of piecemeal preparation and improvement 
of the green infrastructure. The rest of the Actions are focused on vulnerabilities. The 
definition offered in the Strategy for vulnerability tends to frame it more as a descriptor 
of the individual’s circumstances such as “age, health ... proficiency in English... low 
income” (p.42), and less as an outcome of wider social processes such as social 
injustices and inequalities. As one interviewee observed: “we are ‘packing people in’, and 
they are relying on natural ventilation, yet some of their neighbours are reliant upon air 
conditioning and dumping the heat on them...” (interview, 2009). 
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The lack of attention on opportunities epitomises a broader shortcoming of the Strategy 
and its concern with responding to and recovering from the perceived negative 
consequences of climate-related events. The emphasis on bouncing back as in 
engineering resilience, or even forth, as in ecological resilience, fails to consider 
disturbance as a ‘window of opportunity’ for transforming to a radically different and 
more desirable trajectory. To increase the likelihood of such transformation, the social 
learning process should focus as much on detecting potential opportunities as on finding 
out potential vulnerabilities.           
 
Persistence 
 
An important part of managing climate-related risks is the concern for cities’ physical 
infrastructure and utilities. Their ability to withstand a given level of stress is paramount, 
particularly during and shortly after a disaster. Short term robustness (understood as 
rigidity) in this context can be a positive characteristic. However, in the longer recovery 
timeframe and/or the socio-ecological context it can be a disadvantage. For example, 
institutional rigidities can stifle adaptability and innovation both in the short and long 
term. As we mentioned earlier, the P2R2 approach of the London Strategy (in common 
with the approaches taken by other UK climate adaptation strategies) is rooted in the 
disaster risk planning tradition and its predominant concern with short-term post-
disaster responses. This, coupled with the Strategy’s main focus on the physical aspects 
of the city, may explain its dominant engineering approach to resilience. ‘Respond’ is 
defined as “Actions taken in response to an event to limit the impact of the event, for 
example, restricting non-essential water use during a drought, or providing emergency 
accommodation for people displaced by an extreme weather event” (p.19). Thus, many 
of the proposed response actions point to either an array of future ‘plans’, of which many 
relate to emergency plans, or to damage reduction measures particularly in relation to 
the physical fabric of the city. People are mentioned in the Strategy but either as 
potential victims of climate events, or individual actors who, following some ‘awareness 
raising’ campaign and guidance, can become ‘resilient’ by, for example, “taking out 
appropriate insurance cover” (p.31); “fit[ting] flood resilient or resistant measures to 
their homes and buildings” (p.31); “reducing their water consumption” (p.33); or “taking 
measures ...to cope with heatwaves” (p.34). The reliance on individual strengths and 
capacities at the expense of building social networks and capitals (discussed below) is 
another characteristic of the engineering approach to resilience.  
 
Adaptability 
 
Adaptability is at the heart of ecological resilience. As Adger (2003:1) put it, the 
emphasis is on “the ability to persist and the ability to adapt”. While part of adaptability 
lies in flexibility, it also requires resourcefulness (discussed below). Some aspects of 
flexibility and resourcefulness are included in the London Strategy and particularly in the 
recovery phase (of the P2R2 process) which is defined as “Actions taken after an event 
to enable a rapid and cost-effective return to normal, or a more sustainable state” 
(p.19). However, this ecological understanding of resilience is not carried through the 
Strategy to inform its proposed recovery actions. Furthermore, a number of key features 
of ecological resilience are missing from the Strategy.  
 
Flexibility refers to the existence of networks and cooperation as pathways to resilience. 
Some networks facilitate flows of ideas and resources; others enable connections 
between people and institutions (Janssen et al., 2006). Maintaining links among these 
networks is one way of increasing the adaptability of socio-ecological systems. There is a 
growing number of studies which show how social networks have helped post-disaster 
recovery (e.g. Nelson et al., 2007). Although the London Strategy makes a few 
references to community plans with regard to flood planning (Action 9, p.36; Action 27, 
p.70), it does not go into much detail about what these might entail; neither does it pay 
attention to the role of social networks in the response and recovery phases. 
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Cooperation across scales and times is another essential factor for adaptability. In 
ecological contexts, processes that interact across spatial and temporal scales influence 
systems recovery. For example, Nystrom and Folke (2001) have demonstrated the 
importance of networks of connectivity across different spatial scales in the recovery of 
coral reef after hurricanes. The translation of this to socio-ecological systems highlights 
the significance of the connections between critical sectors (such as transport networks 
and social networks) as well as the significance of cooperation between various levels of 
governance in post-disaster recovery. London enjoys a rich network of agencies and 
institutions with responsibility for climate change. These are linked together through an 
array of partnerships with overlapping memberships. This is clearly a strength but can 
also be seen as a weakness, given the disparity of power and responsibilities across 
multiple tiers of governance and between public, private and voluntary sectors, and the 
fragility of the partnerships that have been established to connect them together. For 
example, the recent dismantling of the regional level of governance, including the 
London Development Agency, vi  breaks some important links and cooperative 
arrangements. In this context, the Strategy’s attempt to identify who does what and 
where the gaps are was a step in the right direction. However, it should be noted that 
partnership does not necessary lead to effective cooperation. As noted by one 
interviewee (2009): 
 
I almost see myself as a shepherd sometimes [...] trying to constantly corral 
these people around and say look [...] there are huge opportunities in this [...], 
that we are a forum for actually sharing good practice and potentially coming up 
with projects or incubating projects; but people may not have support for within 
their own organisation, but it is really even a challenge to try and get them on 
board. I mean, partnership working in that sense can be quite difficult, when we 
don’t have [...] statutory authority 
 
The Strategy, however, is based on the assumption that the “Mayor will work with ...” 
(p.7-13) a whole host of other actors and agencies in a somewhat unproblematic way to 
implement the proposed actions. 
    
Resourcefulness refers to efficiency, rapidity, and diversity. While the Strategy is imbued 
with concerns over efficiency and rapidity, as demonstrated above, it is not strong on 
flexibility and diversity. Lack of diversity and the existence of homogenisation were first 
identified by Holling (1986) as factors contributing to the erosion of resilience. Biological 
diversity refers to both different types of species and their different functional role 
(Gunderson, 2009: 8). Economic geographers have long argued that diverse economies 
are better placed in addressing the adverse consequences of shifting macroeconomic 
structures (Pendall et al., 2010). Planners contend that mixed-use developments have a 
better chance of avoiding blight. In the context of climate adaptation, the over-
dependence of London’s economy on financial services and their clustering in a flood 
sensitive area reduces London’s resilience to climate-related events. However, the need 
to introduce diversity in the system over a long period of time, through for example 
spatial planning, is not mentioned in the Strategy, despite the fact that an entire chapter 
is dedicated to ‘London’s Economy’.  
 
 
Transformability  
 
Transformability is what distinguishes evolutionary resilience from engineering and 
ecological resilience. Transformability considers disturbances to systems as an ‘omega’ 
phase of creative destruction (when the system experiences a ‘regime shift’ and crosses 
thresholds at different scales), followed rapidly by an ‘alpha’ phase of renewal and 
reorganisation leading to unpredictable trajectories. This is a volatile and uncertain 
process of transformation where the system shifts to something entirely new: desirable 
or undesirable. In ecological systems, there seems to be little that can be done to steer 
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such transformation. In socio-ecological systems, however, human ingenuity and 
intentionality mean that something can be done. This is if the omega phase of the 
adaptive cycle is framed as a window of opportunity with potentials to transform socio-
ecological processes towards radically different and more desirable paths, without 
underestimating the politics and power involved in determining what is ‘desirable’ 
(Davoudi, 2012a and discussed below). There is a growing divergence of opinions 
regarding whether climate change may be seen as just such a case. Seeing beyond the 
negative consequences of potential climate-related destruction and putting into place 
measures that can turn the destruction into renewal requires a high degree of 
imagination, creativity and political will. The likelihood of such an outcome emerging 
through social learning processes is vastly increased if society is fully engaged in those 
processes. After all, adapting to climate change is not just a technical or environmental 
challenge, “but a social, political and normative challenge”, as highlighted by the Royal 
Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP, 2010: 109). 
 
The transformative potential of climate change is hardly evident in the London Strategy, 
which offers only brief glimpses of a future beyond its proposed emergency planning 
interventions. The Strategy’s dominant engineering understanding of resilience which 
frames recovery as a return to normality, with an over-emphasis on the physical 
continuity of the city, is reflected in the following striking statement that, “once a 
drought is over there is no need for a recovery programme...” (p.33); and, “once a 
heatwave is over, there is little need to recover as there are few lasting effects” (p.34). 
Only “the impacts of flood” are considered to “persist long after the flood has gone and 
initial emergency funding spent” (p.52). This is unfortunate because the making of 
adaptation strategies provides an opportunity for engaging with not only researchers, 
modellers, and officials, but also communities (for a good example of how to do this, see 
Susskind, 2010). Drawing on their knowledge and experience, mobilising their social 
capital, and capitalising on their creativity are essential if alternative futures are to be 
imagined and pursued and actions are to be implemented and publicly accepted. 
Underlining the Strategy’s ‘blind spot’ in this regard is its lack of adequate consultation. 
While the Strategy is made available through websites and in different formats, the 
degree of public consultation on the Strategy appears to be limited to a small paragraph, 
soliciting public suggestions on four dimensions of the Strategy: its evidence base, the 
framework, the actions and the key indicators. The Strategy neither invites comment on 
the civic engagement aspects, nor makes a commitment to a systematic presentation or 
analysis of responses, but only to use ‘best’ ideas in the final versionvii. As noted by the 
RCEP (2010, pp.108-9), there may be considerable differences in the effectiveness of 
public engagement, depending upon whether it is conceived in terms of a one-off event 
or a “continual social intelligence gathering”. There appears to be considerable room for 
improvement in this aspect of the Strategy. As one interviewee commented: “I think, 
because it is a new policy area, […] without [...] external scrutiny, there is a danger that 
we will go off on the wrong track or we just won’t be as ambitious as we should be” 
(Interview, 2009). 
5. Summary and conclusion  
 
Every day we are confronted with events which even dedicated institutions and 
initiatives fail to anticipate, highlighting the difficulties of predicting from which direction 
the next challenge will emerge. Resilience is now hailed as a way of responding to these 
uncertainties. However, the way in which resilience is used and understood is dominated 
by an emphasis on bouncing back to where we were. This is certainly the approach taken 
by the London Climate Change Adaptation Strategy. Its implicit view of resilience veers 
between the ecological and the more rigid engineering interpretation. It seeks resilience 
largely as persistence, embodied in an enduring physical and institutional infrastructure, 
and encapsulated in the P2R2 trajectory from preparation to recovery. Persistence is, 
therefore, viewed as in itself the marker of resilience and more generally as the sign of a 
well-managed organisation or network. This is in contrast with evolutionary resilience 
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and its pursuit of building capacity for envisaging and embracing transformation through 
creativity and imagination at institutional, community and individual levels and through 
cultivating flexibility, resourcefulness and cooperative networks at various scales. 
Evolutionary resilience promotes the institutionalisation of awareness of adaptability 
dynamics as a way of enhancing preparedness and with it, the capacity to influence the 
direction of future transformations. A crucial consequence of the Strategy’s engineering 
approach is its limited attention to the social processes which can enhance or diminish 
resilience. The importance of people’s memories, stories, networks and cooperative 
relationships in building resilience has been given little space in the Strategy.  
 
Another significant consequence of the Strategy’s narrow interpretation of resilience is 
the focus on the more predictable types of events and impacts – the crosscutting ‘health’ 
theme, for example looks at the possibility of disruptions to the NHS, the spread of pests 
and diseases and interruptions to the food supply. This has the effect of sidelining less 
predictable incidents (e.g. windstorms, co-occurring extreme weather events), as well as 
the potential interactions between impacts in the longer term, along with their attendant 
transformative opportunities. For example, in a scenario of long-term elevated average 
temperatures, it is possible to foresee potential negative health impacts, even 
ghettoisation, of what are currently central business areas due to the density of the built 
environment and preference for glass-wall structures. At the same time, this raises the 
possibility of a future enhanced role for more heat-resistant, lower-density city areas.  
 
The capacity to envisage and explore different futures suggested through a fuller 
examination of outcomes at different temporal and physical scales - with willingness to 
expose and address the ‘information gaps’ that emerge en route - is an essential part of 
the preparedness which our model places at the centre of resilience. At the same time, it 
is clear that such scenario building can be perceived as destabilising and as such, 
provoking public resistance. Susskind notes these inherent communication challenges in 
raising climate-related uncertainties in a public context (Susskind, 2010: 223). The only 
clear way of overcoming such resistance, however, seems to lie in a more routine 
incorporation of public involvement and ‘continual social intelligence gathering’ in climate 
adaptation planning.  
 
The concern to ‘manage’ the response of a public as yet unaccustomed to climate 
planning’s uncertainties, alongside the current ubiquity of an emergency planning 
mindset, can go part way to explain why an engineering approach to resilience has 
predominated in other cities besides London. As Fϋnfgeld and McEvoy (2012:326) 
report, other prominent climate adaptation strategies (such as the City of Melbourne) 
are also “framed as risk management” and understand adaptation as “an end point”. 
From a risk management perspective, radical transformation is considered not as a 
desirable outcome but as a system failure. Such a perspective underpins some of the 
‘resilient cities’ programmes and policies that are advocated by international 
organisations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. Evolutionary resilience, 
however, considers climate adaptation as a continuing process which involves social and 
institutional learning and transformative potentials. As such it discourages planners from 
putting the emphasis on rigid and fixed plans and the attempt to command and control 
space and time (Davoudi, 2012b). Instead, the emphasis is on the ubiquity of change 
and its inherent uncertainties, which can be a source of creativity. Based on this 
understanding of resilience, our four-dimensional framework (Figure 2), therefore, 
demands a more far-sighted and multi-scalar ambition for climate change adaptation 
strategies and a more inter-active and imaginative planning. It also provides a useful 
analytical framework for assessing claims to resilience building.  
 
Having said that, we agree with Davoudi’s (2012a) cautionary note and in particular the 
four critical issues which she urged planners to consider when translating resilience from 
ecology to society. These include: the intentionality of human actions, the outcome or 
purpose of resilience, the delineation of system boundaries, and questions of power and 
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politics in defining “resilience from what, to what, and who gets to decide” (Porter and 
Davoudi, 2012: 331). The latter point is particularly pertinent in the context of planning 
which is essentially about the politics of place and what ought to be done, not just to 
respond to the challenges we face, but also in order to shape them.   
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i The ARCADIA Project, July 2009-June 2012 has been supported by the EPSRC award number EP/G060983/1. 
Task 1 of the project explores Climate Change Adaptation governance using London as a fitting case study 
“due both to its climate vulnerability and to the relatively advanced stage of its adaptation planning in the UK 
context” (Davoudi et al., 2010: 4). 
ii Peterson (2000:328) defines scale as “the resolution and extent of the spatial and temporal frequencies of 
[...] the structures and processes” which in interaction with each other lead to the emergence of “ecological 
organisation”.   
iii Panarchy, named for Pan, the Greek god of nature, refers to “how variables at different scales interact to 
control the dynamics and trajectories of change in ecological and socio-ecological systems” (Gunderson, 
2009:4).  
iv The Mayor also has to prepare a Climate Change Mitigation and Energy Strategy to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in London (GLA, 2010b).  
v The Draft adaptation strategy analysed in this paper has since been superseded by a final version published 
in October 2011 (GLA, 2011). Some of the suggestions in this paper (included in an online working paper 
published as part of the dissemination for the ARCADIA project - Davoudi et al., 2010) are addressed in the 
final strategy. But many of the points raised in this paper remain pertinent. 
vi The LDA was reduced, in 2010, to one third of its former staff and was abolished on 31st March 2012, with its 
functions absorbed into the GLA. 
vii The dedicated GLA website for the consultation notes 7,000 responses but only a few dozen are made 
available for each ‘risk’ theme and prominent in the top-rated string are a dozen or so denying the existence or 
human origin of climate change (GLA, 2010c). 
 
 
 
 
 
